The jab: Mandates ruled unlawful by Queensland Supreme Court

The Guardian and other media, 27 February 2024 (see eg https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/27/covid-vaccine-mandate-queensland-emergency-workers-police-ambulance-unlawful

For the judgment transcript please see https://www.queenslandjudgments.com.au/caselaw/qsc/2024/2

I am pleased but not euphoric.

Legal argument can excel in dissection but meanwhile miss its objective – which is justice for all.

We are not there yet. This is an important next step,

Not many will have the appetite for a reading of the whole transcript. Below I have reproduced a few sections from a cursory reading of the judgment, and then added my comments in italics, including embolding of relevant text.

The case involved identifying specific rights, and then determining whether they had been limited (ie impugned) and whether that limitation was justified at the time ….

[69] Section 8 of the HRA (AD: Human Rights Act) defines what is required for a decision to be compatible with human rights:

“8 Meaning of compatible with human rights
An act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if the act, decision or provision—
(a) does not limit a human right; or
(b) limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13.”

[70] The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the decision imposes a limit on human rights.

[71] If that is established, the respondent bears the onus of justifying the limit.

[72] An act or decision will limit a human right if it “places limitations or restrictions on, or interferes with, the human rights of a person.” This inquiry involves considering the scope of the right. The scope of the right should be “construed in the broadest possible way” by reference to the right’s “purpose and underlying values”.

[73] In Certain Children (No 2) Dixon J suggested a two-step process for assessing incompatibility (AD ie the measure is too heavy-handed):

(a) The plaintiff/applicant for human rights relief need only establish prima facie incompatibility before the burden shifts to the defendant public entity to justify the limitations caused by their action/decision.
(b) The burden on the public entity to justify limitations is high, requiring a degree of probability commensurate with the occasion, and must be strictly imposed in circumstances where the individual concerned is particularly vulnerable. {AD: This case reflects preoccupation with the risk from the Covid virus, on the part of the agencies and on the part of the judge. It was clear from the outset that the risk from the virus was minimal for the average person, and presumably less than that for the police cohort. It was also obvious early on that adverse events were occurring from the jab at an unprecedented scale. Risk assessment was poor or missing in action by the agencies involved, and did not properly encompass the vaccines that were the very concern of the applicants.}

[81] Although the memorandum referred to “evidence from other jurisdictions” no such evidence was provided. Further, the “modelling” referred to was just a document created for the financial year 2019/20 entitled Queensland Police Service Daily Policing Demands. It did not provide any predictions of the effect of the pandemic on the QPS. (AD: Do we call this a misleading statement, incompetency, or just a lie? And will the liar be held to account?)

[135] I am not satisfied that the Commissioner has demonstrated that she gave proper consideration to the human rights that might have been affected by her decisions. She could not have seen HRCA No. 1 before making the decision to issue Direction No. 12 and it is more likely than not that she did not receive HRCA No. 2 until after deciding to issue Direction No. 14. Her evidence about considering either HRCA No. 1 or HRCA No. 2 was, at best, inconclusive and, at worst, unreliable.

[136] The Commissioner has failed to demonstrate that, before making either Direction No. 12 or Direction No. 14, she:

(a) understood in general terms which of the rights of the persons affected by the decisions might be relevant and how those rights would be interfered with by the decision;

(b) had seriously turned her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person’s human rights;

(c) had identified the countervailing interests and obligations; and

(d) had balanced competing private and public interests as part of the exercise.

[137] Further, I do not accept that the Commissioner had:

(a) either identified the human rights that might be affected by the decision; or

(b) considered whether the decision would be compatible with human rights.

[138] The “proper consideration” that needs to be given under s 58(1)(b) or s 58(5) engages a standard of consideration higher than that generally applicable at common law to taking into account relevant considerations. That consideration was not given.

[139] It follows that, by failing to give proper consideration, the making of each of those decisions was unlawful.

[176] So far as any review of the Directions was concerned, the Commissioner gave evidence that there was no formal process for reviewing the directions to ensure that the limits imposed on human rights remain. (AD: Process failure, by accident, by incompetence, or deliberately.)

[277] Section 13 of the HRA provides that human rights may be limited in certain conditions:
“ Human rights may be limited
(1) A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
(2) In deciding whether a limit on a human right is reasonable and justifiable as mentioned in subsection (1), the following factors may be relevant—
(a) the nature of the human right;
(b) the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
(c) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose;
(d) whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose;
(e) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(f) the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right;
(g) the balance between the matters mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f).”

(AD This case shows up a deficit in the items listed in Section 13 of the HRA. It needs to include specifically the risks associated with or inherent in the limitation measure itself, as a prerequisite to any objective measure of the associated risk:benefit.)

[301] The applicants argue that the Directions engage this right on the basis that the Directions compel an individual to be vaccinated with a medicine that has the potential for life-threatening side effects and, therefore, it is sufficient to limit the right to life. They go on to say that a balancing exercise may need to be undertaken between the risks of vaccination against the benefits of vaccination and that that should be done on a case-by-case basis. The real point made is that the individual risks associated with vaccination are not required to be considered under the Directions. (AD The wording here is ambiguous. Who is making the point? The judge? The applicants? Surely ALL risks associated with a proposed Direction need to be considered, first the general ones and then the individual ones. A proper risk assessment would have ruled out the mandates without any need to delve into individual risks.) (And The right to Life is read narrowly, thereby frustrating real justice.)

[303] The First Respondent refers in her written submissions to decisions of the European Commission about vaccination schemes. Those decisions do not assist. The first refers to Article 2, paragraph 1 of the European Human Rights Convention which speaks of states being obliged to take adequate measures to protect life which is a different concept to that expressed in s 16.86 (AD The local wording is reflective of Australia’s generally low standard when it comes to framing human rights legislation. The EU wording (below) is consistent with a higher onus on the defendant once the issue has been raised.) In the second case, only one of the applicants was able to proceed because all the others were held not to be “victims” as required by the case law of the Commission. The one applicant who could proceed was denied relief because:

“The Commission recalls that this Article primarily provides protection against deprivation of life. Even assuming that it may be seen as providing protection against physical injury, and intervention such as a vaccination does not, in itself, amount to an interference prohibited by it. (AD: This is rubbish. If the jab causes death and serious injury, and yes, in a somewhat arbitrary way, of course it is captured as warranting protection. A French court has ruled that to take the jab voluntarily is consistent with suicidal thinking.) Moreover, the applicant has not submitted any evidence that, in the particular case of his child, vaccination would create a real medical danger to life”. (AD: If no evidence was submitted, it is a sad omission. The evidence abounds.) (And what about shedding?)

[306] So far as this application is concerned, the underlying argument for the applicants is not that s 16 has been breached, rather that the Directions should have contained a provision which required that each individual’s circumstances be considered. Whether a particular person’s circumstances were such that the application of the Direction might create a risk was the highest that the applicants could argue on this point. There was no contention that a vaccination would arbitrarily deprive any particular applicant of his or her life. (AD: Again, if there was no contention, it is a sad omission. The evidence abounds)

[307] This right was not limited. (AD: I differ.)

[308] Section 17 provides:

“17 Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
A person must not be
(a) subjected to torture; or
(b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or
(c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent.”

[333] The right in s 17(c) is limited. (AD: Agreed)

[383] The experts did express some opinions about those matters, but the relevant issue was when certain evidence was known or otherwise available. A Commissioner of Police or a Director-General of a department is not expected to resolve questions of transmissibility and the like. But they are expected to receive, consider and weigh relevant evidence as it becomes available so that it may inform their decision making. This was a trial about the lawfulness of certain directions not about the effectiveness of vaccines against COVID-19 and its variants. (AD: And as I observed earlier, the whole issue of the inherent RISK of the VACCINES was missing in action.)

[426] Professor Griffin was of the view that there were no reasonably available alternatives to vaccination. (AD: This was of course the official narrative, and was disputed from the outset, by multiple subject matter experts, and proven to be false. The sad irony is that we would have been far better off if government had not done a thing to intervene.)

[451] Neither the Commissioner nor Dr Wakefield gave close attention to the possible range of solutions. Each was presented with a proposal for mandatory vaccination with little in the way of well-developed critiques of alternative means of reducing illness and infection. (AD: A process failure, hard to fathom, echoed across Australia.)

[459] There is no formula which can be used to consider this balance. But, having taken into account the matters argued by the parties, I am not satisfied that the balance is in favour of the applicants and so I conclude that the limit imposed on s 17(c) has been demonstrably justified in the terms of s 13.

(AD:  I am not satisfied by the ‘balance’ reflected in this judgment.  A reminder about what 17c says:

“A person must not be … (c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent.”

No-one on the planet has been fully informed as to the risks associated with the jabs, because so much information has been withheld or falsified, both generally and at point of administration, about their risks and the incidence of death and injury; and because of the media’s fear campaign which massively overstated the risk from the virus; and because of the coercion associated with mandate compliance.)

[460] It also follows from that that the applicants have not established any ground under the JRA of unreasonableness. (AD: I differ, obviously. This is the greatest example of lawless overreach in Australia’s history.)

The jab: Federal agency approval unsupportable

‘Federal agency approval of the COVID-19 mRNA vaccines on a blanket-coverage population-wide basis had no support from an honest assessment of all relevant registrational data and commensurate consideration of risks versus benefits. Given the extensive, well-documented SAEs and unacceptably high harm-to-reward ratio, we urge governments to endorse a global moratorium on the modified mRNA products until all relevant questions pertaining to causality, residual DNA, and aberrant protein production are answered.’

‘COVID-19 mRNA Vaccines: Lessons Learned from the Registrational Trials and Global Vaccination Campaign’, peer-reviewed paper by M. Nathaniel Mead • Stephanie Seneff • Russ Wolfinger • Jessica Rose • Kris Denhaerynck • Steve Kirsch • Peter A. McCullough

(https://www.cureus.com/articles/203052#!/ 24 January 2024

What’s left to say?

Let him who has ears, let him hear.

The evidence cries out for a moratorium.

The jab: “two-foot blood clots”

“Yesterday, I saw patients with 2-foot blood clots in their legs after the vaccine.Injecting people with the genetic code for the lethal spike protein is the most dangerous proposition our government agencies could have ever put forward to our country. … The Covid-19 vaccines should be removed from the market. They’re not safe for human use.”

World-renowned cardiologist Dr Peter McCullough, giving Congressional testimony on 12 January 2024

https://vigilantfox.substack.com/p/dr-mccullough-reveals-disturbing

The evidence mounts, and the testimony mounts, against this engineered bioweapon: unnecessary, ineffective, and unsafe.

And the toll of injury and death continues to mount meanwhile.

We are way past the point of willful ignorance, of plausible deniability. We have erred, not on the side of caution but on the side of intolerable risk

Please God we are approaching the point where light will dispell the darkness, and the protagonists will be laid bare.

“Nothing is hidden, all is laid bare, before the eyes of Him to whom we must give an account. (Hebs 4:13)